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PLESSY v. FERGUSON:
REQUIESCAT IN PACE?
John P. Roche't
When, in 1896, the Supreme Court ruled that Negroes and whites
could be coercively allocated to separate facilities provided they were
substantially equal,' it did little more than give its imprimatur to the
dominant mores of the American community. That "white suprem-
acy" was the loudly announced slogan of the South needs little adum-
bration, but it is less commonly realized that, while less vigorously
articulated, it was equally the majority viewpoint in the North. The
few bold souls who spoke out for the rights of the Negro were them-
selves, almost without exception, committed to a philosophy of segre-
gation,2 much as the leaders of the United Party today in South Africa,
accepting the principle of apartheid, attempt to improve the status of
the Negroes within this conceptual framework.' Even the Negro
leaders of the Plessy period publicly disclaimed any interest in Negro-
white integration,4 and spoke of Negro development as something that
would take place in a segregated context.
If the Supreme Court gave to segregation a legal imprimatur, the
biologists of that day supplied the scientific nihil obstat. It was gener-
ally accepted that the Negroes were, in effect, members of a different
species from whites, and the full stamp of approval was given to the
doctrine of decisive differences in racial characteristics. Thus, in the
same fashion that an intelligent zoo keeper separates the lions and the
" A.B., Hofstra College; A.M., Ph.D., Cornell University; Associate Professor
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1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. Even the strong dissent of Harlan, J., in Plessy v. Ferguson emphasized that
political equality under the Constitution was not equivalent to social equality or racial
integration. The "liberal view" of that era was that the Negro's status would be
improved "among his people"-an attitude which I have termed "racial integralism,"
see Roche, The Future of "Separate But Equal," 12 PHYLON 219 (1951).
Interesting evidence that this approach to segregation was shared by left-
wing thinkers as well as conservatives can be found in the platform of the Louisiana
Socialist Party, prepared in 1903, which advocated "separation of the black and
white races into separate communities, each race to have charge of its own affairs."
See KIPNIs, THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT, 1897-1912, 131 (1952). For the
rabid white supremacist views of some socialist leaders, see id. at 131-32. However,
Eugene V. Debs always opposed segregation, supported by the left-wing of the
Party.
3. See MIARQUARD, THE PEOPLES AND POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRIcA (1952) passim.
4. This attitude, as has recently been suggested with specific reference to Booker
T. Washington, generally considered the arch conciliator and "Uncle Tom," may
have been adopted from tactical considerations rather than from a genuine belief
in the legitimacy and necessity of segregation.
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elephants in different compounds, the Supreme Court endorsed the
proposition that biologically distinct Negroes and whites need not be
given identical treatment. What was good for whites was not neces-
sarily good for Negroes, any more than a lion would necessarily thrive
on an elephant's diet. Fundamental to this view, though not explicit
in the Court decision, was the further corollary that the whites were
more advanced, more "civilized," than the Negroes, that they were sev-
eral steps better, i. e., higher, in the evolutionary scale. 5
The intellectual concepts that were employed by the justices and
by social scientists to justify segregation were, of course, of little inter-
est to Southern politicians. In the view of these practitioners, the hold-
ing in Plessy was just one more victory in their campaign to reverse
Appomattox and to drive the Negro back into that political and social
limbo from which he had but briefly emerged in the Reconstruction
period.6 The logic of white supremacy interested them not at all: it is
hard to justify white supremacy, the superiority of "white blood,"
when one defines as a Negro anyone with one-sixteenth, one-eighth, or
one-quarter "Negro blood ;" indeed, this is logically a patent admission
of the supremacy of "Negro blood," one part of which could apparently
overwhelm an infinite number of contributions made by white ances-
tors.7 But to these politicos, as to the Nazi authors of the Nuremberg
laws, theoretical consistency was supererogatory; what was important
was that white supremacy supplied them with a "political formula," to
use Gaetano Mosca's phrase,8 and for this purpose, one definition of a
Negro was about as good as another.
White supremacy thus had at least three distinguishable aspects-
scientific, legal, and sociopolitical-and in 1896, these three were
marching in step. However, in the course of the last half century this
united front has gradually been broken, until today both science and
law have come down squarely on the side of integration and Negro-
white equality. First to go was the race theory, dynamited by a series
of empirical studies in genetics and anthropology which indicated that,
aside from such surface manifestations as skin pigmentation, eye slant,
bone structure, etc., there is no demonstrable proof of functional or sig-
nificant differences in racial characteristics.9 Moreover, to the great
5. This is patently the rationale of anti-miscegenation legislation.
6. See FRANKIiN, FRom SLAVERY TO FREEDOM, 293-338 (1947), and FRAZIER,
THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES, 128-46 (1949) for good, brief analyses of the
role of the Negro in the Reconstruction era.
7. See Ransmeier, Tle Fourteenth Amendment and the "Separate but Equal"
Doctritw, 50 Mic. L. REv. 253-54 (1951).
8. See MoscA, THE RULING CLASS (English transl., 1939) passim.
9. See DUNN AND DOBZHANSKY, HEREDITY, RACE, AND SocIETY (1946); KLINE-
BERG, RAcE DIFFERENCES (1935).
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dismay of genealogists, these scientists went on to assert that, what-
ever may have been the case at some remote time in the past, racial
purity is today a chimera. Wars and conquests, to say nothing of nor-
mal standards of concupiscence, have so merged ethnic stocks that the
quest for a pure Negro, pure Mongolian, or pure white is largely
illusory. But, unfortunately, geneticists and anthropologists do not
make public policy on the "race" issue: the politician's approach to the
scientist is usually comparable to the drunk's attitude towards the lamp-
post: he wants support, not light.
This is not the place to discuss in detail the progress of the Negro
minority towards full legal and political equality.1" Suffice it to say
that the Twentieth Century has seen a rapidly accelerating movement,
among both Negroes .and whites, North and South, directed towards
implementing the promise of American ideals. The rate of accelera-
tion has increased tremendously over the last twenty years, with per-
haps the greatest single catalyst being the almost universal American
revulsion against the brutal racialism of Nazi Germany. One after
another, the decisive institutions of American society-the churches,
the press, the schools, and eventually the Federal Government 1-have
gone on record for equality. It would be naive in the extreme to sug-
gest that this was wholly based on disinterested idealism; on the con-
trary, highly practical and pragmatic motives, such as institutional com-
petition, have unquestionably been decisive in many instances. It might
be suggested, for example, that the racial pioneering of the Catholic
Church in the South, with a concomitant huge increase in the number
of Negro communicants, may have spurred the Protestants to a greater
appreciation of the New Testament message of brotherhood; and the
competition for Negro votes in certain key areas has similarly led polit-
ical organizations to reassess the meaning of equality.' But however
10. Generally see note 6 supra. See also MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
(1944). A good, short survey of the legal aspects of this progress is Ransmeier,
The Fourteenth Aineindtwnt and the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 50 MicH. L.
REV. 203 (1951).
11. In the five school segregation cases decided in May, 1951, the United States
Attorney General presented a brief amicus curiae urging the Court to ban segrega-
tion in public education. Initiated by a Democratic administration, this position sur-
vived the 1953 change in Attorneys General. A key role in the growing public con-
sciousness of the injustice of segregation was played by the blunt REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
12. An amazingly coldblooded instance of this play for the Negro vote took place
in the 1953 election of Borough President of Manhattan. After the Republicans
nominated a Negro for this position, an unseemly race occurred between the other
parties to find Negro candidates of their own. Eventually all three major candidates-
Republican, Democratic, and Liberal-were Negroes, an outcome that was achieved
after white candidates of the Democratic and Liberal parties withdrew precipitously
in favor of Negroes. While a good many Negroes were disturbed by this race
prejudice in reverse, the result was that a Negro Borough President took office. See
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1953, p. 1, col. 2; id., July 31, 1953, p. 1, col. 5; id., Aug. 15,
1953, p. 1, col. 2; id., Aug. 19, 1953, p. 20, col. 3.
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motivated, the fact is plain: the Negro today has moved to the thresh-
hold of full equality in the United States. The realization that the
armed forces, to take a good case, abolished segregation largely to at-
tain maximum standards of manpower efficiency in no way detracts
from the desirability of the end result.
Fed by this growing institutional consensus, the courts have step
by step eroded the legal ground upon which the segregation system
stands. First to go was the white primary, the ingenious device by
which Negroes were excluded from the political process.1 3 Next went
the restrictive covenant, which denied to Negroes the capitalist prerog-
ative of purchasing any property they could afford. 4 But the crucial
area of decision has been education, in which a series of holdings have
gradually cut the ground out from under "separate but equal." '5 This
was not accidental, for the Legal Department of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People decided at an early date
that it was precisely at this point that the segregation system was most
vulnerable to attack, and marshalled its heavy weapons for a long as-
sault on the weak point.'
The Supreme Court's ruling in the Segregation Cases'7 has
proved the wisdom of this strategy. This epochal decision of May,
1954, far outdistances in its impact even such massive acts of judicial
legislation as The Insular Cases 18 and Erie v. Tompkins; 19 in effect,
the Supreme Court has rewritten basic public policy in seventeen
states 20 and numerous non-Southern communities. The remainder of
13. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
14. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948).
15. See Roche, Education, Segregation, and the Supreme Court-A Political
Analysis, 99 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 949 (1951); Graham, The Fourteenth Amendment
and School Segregation, 3 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 (1954) ; Ransmeier, supra note 10.
16. The decisive role that Negro lawyers have played in the movement towards
equality has probably led many a Southern politician to echo the Sixteenth Century
sentiments of the Spanish conquerers of the New World who asked the King of
Spain to prohibit emigration to the colonies by lawyers as they would "encourage
dissentions and litigation" and "throw us into confusion with their learning, quibbling
and books." Scxuaz, THIs N-w WORLD 149 (1954).
17. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
18. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138 (1904); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Statutes cited in
Leflar and Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HAgv. L. REV. 377,
378 n.3 (1954). This footnote also contains a full breakdown of varying degrees
of segregation permitted in various jurisdictions.
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this analysis will examine in some detail two significant aspects of the
decision: first, its status as a political act; and, second, the problems
involved in implementing the holding.
THE SEGREGATION CASES: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Like McCulloch v. Maryland,1 the segregation decision is far
more than merely the settlement of litigation between parties; on the
contrary, it will stand as a major state paper. Although, on its merits,
the holding applies only to segregation in secondary public education,
it is inconceivable that segregation in transportation, theatres, railroad
stations, etc., can long survive. While education can probably, with
diligent exegesis, be distinguished from transportation and the other
areas of mandatory segregation,22 the Court did not return to its tactic
in the Sweatt and McLaurin24 cases and avoid reconsideration of
the "separate but equal" principle. In contrast with the earlier deci-
sions, Chief Justice Warren explicitly stated that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." 25 Ignored
in the electoral process, emasculated in education, the doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson must inexorably lose its vitality elsewhere. Unlike
a Ptolemaic theory of the universe, a society can not continue to op-
erate indefinitely by the creation of special rules, of epicycles, which
govern certain limited areas. A system based on applying one prin-
ciple to children in school and another to the same children in parks,
trolley cars, or theatres would be an administrative nightmare, to say
nothing of its ideological merits. Consequently, by the same token
that "separate but equal" silently spread from one area of group rela-
tions to another until it governed legal relationships in every social
21. 4 Wheat 316 (U.S. 1819).
22. This is discussed in Kauper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline
of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 Mica. L. REv. 1137 (1954). The Supreme Court, follow-
ing the Segregation Cases, disposed of two noteworthy cases involving segregation
in other fields. In Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th
Cir. 1953), the circuit court upheld the refusal of entry to a Negro at an outdoor
operatic perfomance sponsored by a private association which had rented the city's
amphitheater for specified dates during the summer. The Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case "for consideration in light of the Segregation
Cases . . . and conditions that now prevail." 347 U.S. 971 (1954). Certiorari was
denied a circuit court holding that a city must provide golf facilities for Negroes,
since such facilities were available for whites; but the city was permitted to provide
the facilities on a segregated basis. Holcombe v. Beal, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954). A Maryland district court recently found that the
reasoning of the Segregation Cases does not apply to public bathing and swimming
facilities. The court consequently held that a city could maintain segregation in
these facilities. Lonesome v. Maxwell, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2057 (D.C. Md. July 27,
1954).
23. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
24. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
25. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
PLESSY v. FERGUSON: R.I.P.
context, the doctrine that separate is unequal will spread from educa-
tion to the littoral of Negro-white relations. The Court's willingness
to exclude "separate but equal" from education equally destroys it as
a rationale for action elsewhere, practically if not legally.
While the reading of political motives into the activities of the
justices may be a dangerous game, and one better fitted for psychoan-
alysts than political scientists, certain aspects of the segregation deci-
sion do merit analysis from this viewpoint. Once again, as in the 1950
cases," the decision of the Court was unanimous. Even Justice
Frankfurter, who has vigorously stated in the past his opposition to
the Court's functioning as a school board,2 7 refrained from separate
concurrence. This unanimity was a political accomplishment of the
first magnitude, for it confronted dissenters from the judgment with a
united Court, of Southern and Northern antecedents, of Democratic
and Republican vintage. No dissents exist to supply opponents with
an established position whence to launch a counter-offensive. To deal
in mythical terms-and the Supreme Court plays a vital role in Amer-
ican political mythology-there is a majesty about a unanimous Court
which vanishes with only one dissent: the Truth has been pronounced
rather than competing truths propounded.
A second consideration with political overtones was the delay in
reaching final determination. The South Carolina case first made its
way to the Court in the fall of 1951, but was remanded to the District
Court on a technicality.2" In June, 1952, after the lower court had
exercised its authority, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction,29 and in
October, 1952, the South Carolina, Virginia,"° and Kansas8 1 cases
were consolidated for joint argument 2 The District of Columbia case
was accepted for review in November, 1952." Full argument was
heard in December, 1952, but in June, 1953,4 the Court ordered the
cases restored to the docket for reargument in October, 1953, and in-
26. See Roche, Education, Segregati m and the Supreme Court-A Political
AllVsiS, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 949 (1951), for a discussion of the 1950 cases.
27. In the opinion of the Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586 (1940) and then in a somewhat bitter dissent in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943), overruling Gobitis.
28. Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
29. Briggs v. Elliott, 72 Sup. Ct. 1078 (1952).
30. Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 344 U.S. 1
(1952).
31. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
32. Ibid.
33. Bolling v. Sharpe, 344 U.S. 873 (1952).
34. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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cluded for special consideration the famous five questions.35 The deci-
sion was handed down on May 17, 1954, but even this was not the
end of the road, for the Court put off until the fall of 1954 considera-
tion of specific techniques of implementation and formulation of final
decrees."0 In effect, the Court has ordered the reargument of ques-
tions 4 and 5 on its list of June, 1953.
Delay can be caused by many factors, and it would call for great
temerity to assert that the Court's slow-motion disposal of these cases
was the outgrowth solely of political factors. But, on the other hand,
the sceptic is surely within his rights in asking why the South Carolina
case was "ripe" for determination after the 1952 election rather than
on its first trip to the Court in 1951. Justices Black and Douglas
thought it was ready for decision at the earlier date, but their brethren
overruled them.Y7 Furthermore, while of enormous significance, the
35. "1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State
legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated
or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish
segregation in public schools?
"2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the Four-
teenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the immediate
abolition of segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of
the framers of the Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under section
5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions,
to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?
"3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2(a) and (b) do not dispose
of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish
segregation in public schools?
"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Four-
teenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set
by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be
admitted to schools of their own choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective
gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems
to a system not based on color distinctions?
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in ques-
tion 4(b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a
view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions
to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should
the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of
first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed de-
crees?" 345 U.S. 972-73 (1953).
36. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
37. These two justices felt that the constitutional issue was fully ripe, and
that the further delay would only lead to obtaining irrelevant information. Briggs
v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350, 352 (1952).
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question before the Court was not inherently complex; indeed, the
alternatives were clear cut. NAACP counsel had taken great pains
to ensure a ruling on the merits by bringing up cases which presented
the issue in its starkest terms, e.g., the Kansas case 8 in which all
hands stipulated that the schools provided Negroes were fully equal
to those provided whites. What faced each individual justice was not
a complicated procedural labyrinth such as he might encounter in ad-
ministrative or patent litigation; it was a basic decision on the specific
content of American democracy.
Given the nature and gravity of the cause, it might be hypothesized
that the delay was, at least in some part, occasioned by the desire of
the Court to achieve unanimous determination of the issues involved.
Perhaps the Court could have handed down a decision sooner, but only
at the cost of vitiating dissents by some of its members. It may be
that, as various newspapers and magazines suggested, the influence of
the new Chief Justice was decisive in attaining judicial unity, and it
also seems like a fair guess to say that some members of the Court
probably joined the ranks on the condition that decision and imple-
mentation be treated as two discrete and temporally distinct actions.
This latter expedient would have great natural appeal to more cautious
jurists who could thus agree to the establishment de jure of integrated
schools, while adjusting de facto execution to the exigencies existing
in different areas.
However justified, the agreement to put off actual implementation
until at least 1955 was a stroke of political genius. Although it ap-
peared to some advocates of full equality as a symptom of judicial
equivocation, it muffled Southern reaction to an extraordinary extent.
Southern extremists were prepared to denounce a decision which ended
segregated schools, but the Court left them completely off balance with
its two-step holding. If the Court had issued its decrees simultaneously
with its judgment, these extremists would have had something into
which to sink their teeth. Instead, they were left to battle a phantom
enemy for at least a year, while Southern moderates were supplied
with an excellent rhetorical position from which to conduct their cam-
paign. The latter were in the position of saying to the people, "What
is all this bellowing about? We haven't even found out what we are
going to have to do."
In addition, as many political commentators have noted, the
interest-span of the American people tends to be short. Miniature golf,
the yo-yo, General MacArthur, Johnnie Ray, are the center of short,
38. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D.C. Kan.
1951).
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violent spasms which soon subside. The Southern extremists are now
face to face with this psychological phenomenon: they built up opinion
for the grand climax, only to be given a year's intermission at the
crucial point. It is to be doubted whether they can sustain a fever
pitch over that period of time without committing the cardinal sin of
American politics: boring the sovereign people. Legal purists have
often complained about a Supreme Court perpetually populated with
politicians; perhaps the political tactics of the justices in this case sup-
ply some evidence for the contrary position, that critical legal decisions
are far too important to be left in the hands of legal technicians.
One other aspect of the decision deserves brief comment: the ex-
traordinary fact that, in a group of cases technically between specific
parties, the attorneys general "of the states requiring or permitting
segregation in public education" are invited to appear as amici curiae
at the argument on implementation in the fall of 1954.11 This puts
these officials in an extremely hazardous position. If they refuse to
submit briefs, they are open to the accusation that they did nothing
to save their states from drastic decrees.soa On the other hand, if they
do submit briefs, the latter must be drawn up within the framework of
desegregation, and the attorneys general are thus, willy-nilly, put on
record as supporting in principle the Court's holding. Moreover, the
fiction that these are simple lawsuits between parties has in fact been
abandoned by the Court, which is instead calling a forum of interested
parties-the NAACP as counsel for the Negro plaintiffs, the school
boards, the United States Attorney General, and the state attorneys
general-to help find a practical solution to the problem.
In summary, the Supreme Court, in a major political decision, has
revised an enormous body of public policy. There are those who be-
wail the fact that the Court is too political,40 and others who deny its
policy-making prerogatives, 41 but the framers of the Constitution in-
tended the Court to exercise this function, and the justices have exer-
cised it to a greater or lesser degree since the foundation of the Re-
39. Bown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 483, 496 (1954).
39a. It appears that the states of Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Arkansas,
Tennessee, Maryland and Texas are filing briefs, and that Georgia, Alabama, South
Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana are boycotting the proceedings. Significantly,
in support of the position advanced above, Alabama's Attorney General announced
that his state would file no brief because if such action were taken, the state would
be bound legally and morally to accept the final decree. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15,
1954, p. 27, col. 1.
40. See, e.g., Mishkin, Prophecy, Realism and the Supreme Court: The De-
velopnent of Institutional Unity, 40 A.B.A.J. 680 (Aug. 1954).
41. The latest to tilt at the windmill of judicial "usurpation" is W. W. Crosskey
in his semantic safari POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(2 vols. 1953).
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public4 The real argument, trimmed of polemical excess, is over
whose politics the Court endorses, and the American tradition is to
denounce the Court when it adopts your opponent's views and ap-
plaud it when it subscribes to the Truth, i. e., your own position.43
The current case is no exception. Southern politicians, known far and
wide as pillars of conservatism and the rule of law, are now attacking
the "political court." " It is predictable that, had the decision gone the
other way, they would be equally vigorous in their assault on any who
criticized the determination of our "great impartial tribunal." Viewed
sub specie aeternitatis, the basic principle of American constitutional
interpretation, and of American politics, is "whose ox is gored ?" "
But to say this is not to engage in disinterested, puerile cynicism,
for some oxen are patently better than others. Thus, judged in terms
of the democratic ethic and the Judeo-Christian tradition which sus-
tains it, the Supreme Court in May, 1954, took a great stride towards
the realization of the American ideal. Much remains to be done, but
in a world filled with oppression and rumors of oppression, this is no
small achievement.
THE PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
In a democratic society, or, for that matter, in any non-totalitarian
society, law is not enforced by the police, but by the community it-
self.4" Coercion is applied in exemplary fashion to conspicuous de-
viants from social norms, but the great bulk of compliance is automatic,
resting on the consensus of the community. If the society, or a large
proportion of it, rejects a norm, direct coercion is of little value, e. g.,
prohibition. To take an example from a different setting, a British
district officer in Nigeria who was asked how he kept order among
10,000 Yoruba tribesmen with five policemen, replied that if five police-
42. In short, I unconditionally accept the position of Professor Eugene V.
Rostow that ". . . there can be little real doubt that the courts were intended from
the beginning to have the power they have exercised." Rostow, The Democratic
Character of Jidicial Review, 66 HARv. L. RFv. 193, 195 (1952).
43. A classic case of this "true believer jurisprudence," as I have called it else-
where, was the abolitionist approach to constitutional law: see TEN BROEK, THE
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT 42-70 (1951).
44. "The South will not abide by nor obey this legislative decision by a political
court." (Senator Eastland, Miss.) "A flagrant abuse of judicial power." (Senator
Russell, Ga.) The justices "abandoned their role as judges of the law and organized
themselves into a group of social engineers." (Senator Stennis, Miss.) These
quotations and others can be found in Cong. Q. Weekly Report, June 4, 1954, p. 696,
col. 1.
45. Or, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt liked to phrase it, "whose child has
the measles.'
46. See RocHE AND STErzAN, THE DYNAwics oF DEmOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
c. 10 (1954).
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men could not handle the job, the chances were that neither could 5,000
soldiers.
Viewed in this context, it is apparent that the Supreme Court can
not by itself enforce desegregation on seventeen state governments. Its
authority is largely moral, and, needless to say, in this particular situa-
tion, the Court can count on little support from Congress. Even con-
victions for criminal contempt of-court depend on the decision of a
locally oriented jury, so this judicial weapon is not fully reliable. How,
then, can the Supreme Court ensure that the final decrees in the segre-
gation cases are put into practice?
The precise answer to this question must, of course, await the
historian of the future. The general question of how the Court can
enforce its views has troubled commentators since the hectic days of
Chisholm v. Georgia,4 7 and there is no denying that the instant cases
present special problems. The major difficulty is the localization of
segregation sentiment in the South. If those who favored segrega-
tion were a national minority scattered throughout the Union, the
problem would be negligible, for in each area they would be outnum-
bered by those to whom segregation, if not a positive evil, seemed
only a trivial matter. Unfortunately this is not the case, for the pro-
ponents of segregation are concentrated geographically in areas where
they have complete control of state and local government and have
enforced their views through the police power. A good example of
the kind of problem that results from this concentration is the passage
by the Louisiana state legislature, after the Court's decision, of three
measures to perpetuate segregation 4 -although palpable, and not very
cleverly designed dodges, they passed by overwhelming votes. Other
such devious maneuvers can be anticipated.49
The best answer to the question appears to be that the Court will
not enforce its decision; rather, it will supply a catalyst to those forces
in the South that will, in the long run, abolish segregation. The long-
standing myth of the monolithic character of Southern political life
must initially be exposed; in fact, as V. 0. Key has shown in his superb
Southern Politics,5 virtually the only unity that does exist is a verbal
agreement on white supremacy. Furthermore, there are forces at work
47. 2 Dall. 419 (U.S. 1793).
48. Discussed in Ryan, Reactim and Heat Ride in the Bayous, The New Leader,
Aug. 16, 1954, p. 23, col. 2.
49. See Frank, Can the Courts Erase the Color Line?, 2 BUvFALO L. REv. 28,
39-40 (1940). One practical device for evading the segregation decision arose in
Montgomery, Alabama, recently when twenty-three Negro students were refused
admission to the white school because they lived in another school district. The
smaller Negro school to which the students were relegated was only a block away
from the new white school. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1954, p. 11, col. 1.
50. KEY, SOUrTIERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949).
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undermining this barrier: the young Southerner, who may have shared
a Korean foxhole with a Negro soldier, seems to have a good deal less
faith in the slogan of white supremacy than his father or grandfather.5
There is a growing discontent among businessmen with the high eco-
nomic price that must be paid for racial superstitions, and, with the
rapid industrialization of the South, capitalist standards of efficiency
are militating against the system. In short, the South is not united
behind segregation, and the moderation displayed by many Southern
politicians since May, 1954,52 indicates that strong forces of compro-
mise and concession are checking the extremist battalions.
All that has been said thus far would give the reader the impres-
sion that the South is white, and that any decisions that are to be taken
on the question of segregation will be the exclusive concern of whites.
While Southern politics, at least since the end of Reconstruction, have
been the private preserve of white men, the growing potential of the
Negro component of Southern society and its probable consequences
can not be omitted from any realistic account of what the future may
hold. In the eighteen jurisdictions which have mandatory segrega-
tion, there was in 1950 a total Negro population of 10,522,495.1i
Long denied their political rights by one technique or another, these
Negroes have in recent years been moving to the polls in ever increas-
ing numbers and have been awakening to a consciousness of their po-
tential strength." In this group, the Supreme Court, and those poli-
ticians who endorse it, have a built-in constituency, and it may be pre-
dicted with some certainty that as the Negro electorate grows in
strength and awareness, its views on segregation will be heard. Per-
haps they are already being heard, at least in a minor key, for part of
the tremendous majorities that "liberal" Southern Democrats received
in the 1954 Democratic primaries has been credited to Negro support
for men accused of betraying white supremacy. Senator John
Sparkman, for instance, is believed to have received 90% of the Negro
votes cast in the Alabama primary, and in a state with a Negro pop-
ulation approximating one million, this is no inconsiderable asset.5"
51. See the interesting analysis of this changing viewpoint in Lenoir and Lenoir,
Compulsory Legal Segregation in, the Public Schools With Special Reference to
Georgia, 5 MERcER L. REv. 211 (1954).
52. See the quotations by Senators Daniel (Texas), Holland (Fla.) and Byrd
(Va.), and by Governor McKeldir of Maryland in Cong. Q. Weekly Report, supra
note 44.
53. See note 20 supra.
54. U.S. BUREAu OF THE CENsus, STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1953, 36 (74th ed. 1953).
55. See MooN, BALANCE OF POWER: THE NEGRo VoTE (1948).
56. It was similarly estimated that 90% of the 200,000 Negroes who voted in the
Democratic primary elections in Texas voted for Judge Yarborough who refused at
that time to denounce the segregation decision. See Eubanks, The Heat Is on
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It is obvious that school integration will not be accomplished at one
blow. If experience is any guide, the process of compliance will prob-
ably begin with full cooperation by certain authorities, notably in the
border states and in the bigger cities of the deep South, partial com-
pliance by others, and outright recusancy on the part of a few. 7 The
litigation will be enormous, for subterfuges of all sorts will be tried
and challenged. But the basic clue to success is the mobilization of
the lawful majority, and here the Supreme Court has supplied the
standard around which they can rally. No longer in the exposed posi-
tion of being mere defenders of the Negro, the moderates are now the
forces of law and order, the guardians of the Constitution. In addi-
tion, if the research of social psychologists is correct, the number of
people who reject segregation will increase as a direct coefficient of in-
tegration, i. e., the more people there are exposed to integrated situa-
tions, the more there will be who favor desegregation. 8  Thus, in a
sense, integration will tend to create its own public opinion, and at an
increasingly rapid rate of acceleration.
Thus, using the term in its broadest connotation, the Supreme
Court's function is an educational one. It has supplied a standard of
Negro-white relationships which fits most fully with the democratic
objectives professed by most Americans, operating on the assumption
that, given an opportunity, most Americans would prefer to practice
what they preach. To put the point this way, however, is not to urge
a counsel of supercaution, for the Court must also be bold. Coercive
sanctions are, on occasion, an admirable educational technique," and
it may be necessary to employ the full force of contempt proceedings
in some instances.60 Faced with the threat of legal action, the most
Shivers in Texas, The New Leader, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 12, col. 1. Yarborough later
did denounce the Court decision and, as a consequence, many Negroes and liberal
whites who had voted for him in the primary abstained from participating in the
run-off. His loss to Shivers cannot be wholly attributed to this factor, but it
apparently played an important part in the outcome.
57. Thus far, twelve of the seventeen compulsory segregation states are still
awaiting the Supreme Court's decrees before taking measures towards abolishing
segregation. However, in five states (Arkansas, West Virginia, Missouri, Maryland
and Delaware) and the District of Columbia, action has been taken in some areas
to commence the integration process. Legal Intelligencer (Philadelphia, Pa.),
Aug. 31, 1954, p. 1, col. 3.
58. See KiEcH AND CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
513-29 (1948); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMaITTEE ON CIVI RIGHTS 82-87
(1947).
59. KRECH AND CRUTCHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 58, at 512-13.
60. The use of coercive sanctions raises the general problem of what legal devices
are available to the courts to insure compliance with its mandates. Although a de-
tailed discussion of the area is beyond the scope of this article, see generally Note,
Civil and Criininal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1947) ; HART
AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 420-21 (1953);
Note, 20 TEXAS L. REv. 358 (1942); Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 659 (1949). For
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fiery agitators usually take to cover, and their armies of dedicated sup-
porters turn out to be, at best, rhetorical fictions, at worst, spectators,
prepared to join a winning cause, but basically out to see the show.
Turning, in conclusion, to the specific matter of the decrees to be
formulated during the 1954-55 term of Court, the following sugges-
tions, advanced with great trepidation, may merit consideration. First,
the Court should rule that it can, in the exercise of its equity powers,
establish flexible rules to govern desegregation. 1 As indicated in the
Ashmore Report, 2 a monumental inquiry into the problems of Negro
education, the physical barriers to integration are in some areas enor-
mous, and not immediately surmountable, even given all the good will
in the world. Such areas will need more time to consolidate than
others more favorably situated. However, to prevent deliberate stall-
ing, an outside time limit for completion of the whole process-per-
haps five years ?-should be established.
Second, the Court should appoint a special master charged with
recommending the specific tempo of desegregation to be applied in the
differing cases. The master should be an outstanding political figure of
the genus "elder statesman." ' My nominee is former President
Harry S. Truman. Not only would he carry with him to his assign-
ment the special status accruing to former Chief Executives, but he also
has behind him the superb training of the presidency. Much of a
President's time is taken up with getting subordinates to do what they
are supposed to do without actually forcing them to obey, and it would
be difficult to find a more accurate description of the task facing the
special master. Furthermore, Mr. Truman is a Democrat, a man of
great political courage, and highly regarded in the South.64 The
master should be aided by a technical staff competent to assess the
actual legal and educational problems.
discussions of the state courts' compliance in disposing of cases remanded to them
by the Supreme Court see 67 HARV. L. Riv. 1251 (1954) ; 56 YA.LE L.J. 574 (1947);
55 HAuv. L. REv. 1357 (1942).
61. Future argument on the form of the segregation decree will be partly con-
cerned with the availability of such equity power to allow a gradual adjustment to
integrated schools. See question 4(b), quoted in note 35 supra.
62. AsHmoRE, THE NEGRO AND THE SCHOOLS (1954).
63. Perhaps the most famous use of a special master occured in Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), rehearings, 281 U.S. 179 and 696 (1930), where
neighboring states complained that Chicago was lowering the level of the Great
Lakes in its use of water for sewage disposal. The Court held for the complainants
and employed Charles Evans Hughes as a special master to evolve a suitable plan
for gradual discontinuation of Chicago's use of the Great Lakes' water. Hughes
was authorized to call witnesses on behalf of each party and also witnesses of his
own choosing. For his efforts Hughes was awarded $30,000 compensation plus his
expenses. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 638-39 (1951).
64. Although we sometimes tend to overlook it, Mr. Truman is a Southern
Democrat and, despite some sniping from extremists, a very highly respected one.
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This may seem like a strange expedient: why should the Court
not simply remand these cases to district courts for final settlement? It
might be said in reply that initially the Court must retain control at
the center. Perhaps eventually the lower courts can handle these cases,
but the fact can not be over emphasized that the first few decrees will
be of crucial significance to the success of the whole enterprise. They
will tend to establish a pattern for later action. If these decrees are
wisely drawn and accepted in good faith, the battle will be half won.
But to accomplish this end, more is needed than legal draftsmanship-
there must be negotiation, and skilled negotiation at that. This type
of negotiation, in which parties get a chance to express their visceral
reactions but are eventually brought to a sensible position, is a fine
political art. Furthermore, it is an important form of therapy, a fact
to which labor lawyers and arbitrators will bear witness. If contest-
ing parties are given an opportunity to express themselves fully-and
incidentally, to square themselves with their constituencies-it is sur-
prising how far they will go, if properly induced, in the direction of
accepting disagreeable consequences. It seems unnecessary to add that
few district judges possess the catalytic skill required for this sort
of group guidance.
Some may be distressed by this proposal, feeling that it is a thor-
oughly "un-legal" way of settling a judicial problem. Perhaps it is,
but the cold fact is that the Supreme Court is involved to the limit in
an explosive political situation, and its success or failure in settling this
critical issue may well hinge on its ability to devise an imaginative
political solution. Put bluntly, the Supreme Court has staked its insti-
tutional reputation on its capacity to solve the race question in terms
of the American ideal. Whether it wins or loses its magnificent gamble
will not be determined by the Court's facility with democratic political
theory, but by the effectiveness with which it copes with the details
of desegregation. The justices have propounded bold thoughts, but
before a tombstone can be inscribed "Plessy v. Ferguson: R.I.P.,"
they must match their aspirations with effective actions.
